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DRAFTING PETITIONS FOR THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
BY: MATTHEW B. CRUM
This article will briefly discuss certain aspects of the writ of
certiorari that may be helpful to defense counsel in a capital case. It
will explore the reasoning behind the Court's granting the writ and
will pass on suggestions for a successful petition. The Clearinghouse
does not presume to offer expert advice on this complex topic. Rather,
its intention is to arouse interest and convey some sense of the task at
hand.'
Capital defense counsel are called upon to petition for the writ of
certiorari in two circumstances. First, after the Virginia Supreme
Court affirms the circuit court's decision and second, after the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirms the denial of habeas corpus relief.
The Virginia Supreme Court rarely grants relief, and new developments
in federal law drastically have reduced the scope of habeas review.
Even though the chances that certiorari will be granted are slim, the
petition is worth maximizing counsel's efforts. 2 Furthermore, there
is no right to appointed, compensated counsel for certiorari, so
counsel may be called on to volunteer when there are less than 90 days
available.
3
Factors and Reasons for Granting the Writ
Each year the Supreme Court hears and decides approximately
160 cases on the merits. 4 This number has changed very little over the
past forty years, while the number of petitions filed with the Court
continues to escalate to over 4,000 per year.5 With such a vast number
of petitions to choose from, the Court can operate upon the unique
premise of finding flaws in apparently certworthy petitions, rather
than unearthing worthy petitions concealed by weak draftsmanship.
6
Should a petition of profound importance slip through the Court's
necessarily cursory screening process, it is considered no great loss by
the Justices, for if it is indeed 'certworthy,' it will soon be seen again,
and again. 7 Therefore, it is of paramount importance for defense
counsel to scrupulously review all factors that may be weighed by the
Court in its cert-granting process in order to draft the strongest
petition possible.
The Court reveals its criteria for granting certiorari in two ways.
It lays out general considerations for granting the writ in Rule 10 of
the Rules of the Supreme Court, and it occasionally mentions in its
opinions why it chose to hear a case. Rule 10 outlines factors that the
Court may consider. It does not provide any strict guidelines.8 Rule
10 states:
"A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but
of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will
be granted only when there are special and important rea-
sons therefore. The following, while neither controlling nor
fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the charac-
ter of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a United States court of appeals has rendered a
decision in conflict with the decision of another United
States court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided a
federal question in a way in conflict with a state court of last
resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a depar-
ture by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's
power of supervision.
(b) When a state court of last resort has decided a federal
question on a way that conflicts with the decision of another
state court of last resort or of a United States court of
appeals.
(c) When a state court or a United States court of appeals has
decided an important question of federal law which has not
been, but should be, settled by this court, or has decided a
federal question in a way that conflicts with applicable
decisions of this Court.9
Despite the admonition that the factors set forth in Rule 10 are not
decisive, time and caselaw have revealed some generalities that make
Rule 10 more significant and potentially fruitful in its application.
A. Conflicts between courts
A well-recognized reason for granting the petition is a conflict
between the final decision upon which review is sought and that of the
Supreme Court or other court whose decision is final.10 Such deci-
sions should present an intolerable conflict on the same issue of law
or fact and not simply a discrepancy in dicta or the application of
general principles. I I If the dispute is minor or technical, the conflict
may be considered insufficient to warrant the Court's attention.
12
Furthermore, the Court may not deem the petition certworthy if the
decision with which the case in issue purportedly conflicts has lost
authority or has been discredited through intervening decisions of
other lower courts and/or the Supreme Court. 13 Although most peti-
tioners characterize their lower court losses as the result of decisions
that conflict with Supreme Court decisions, such conflicts often are
arguable misinterpretation or misapplication of law rather than a clear
conflict of law. 14 The Court interprets Rule 10(c) as demanding a
clear and direct conflict, which is readily apparent from the lower
court's decision. 15 Conflicts often treated as tolerable include: (1) A
dispute between two panels within the same federal circuit, which can
be resolved en banc; or (2) A state court decision differing from a
federal circuit court ruling that reflects simple error in application and
not an intolerable ambiguity in federal law. 16 Conflicts based upon
general principle may be deemed certworthy, but each should be
clearly stated and not confused with a conflict in the application of
rules of law. 17 The Court is likely to review conflicts between
two federal courts of appeals where the case sought to be reviewed is
in direct conflict with a decision of another court of appeals on the
same matter of federal law or on the same matter of general law as to
which federal courts can exercise independent judgment.18 The
purpose of such review is to ensure uniformity among the circuits.
Petitioner should be able to state with confidence that another circuit
would decide the case differently if presented with identical facts. 19
However, the Supreme Court may deny certiorari if it feels that such
conflict will be cleared up by future cases in those circuits, or where
the conflict will have slight bearing upon future cases .20 Furthermore,
respondent to a petition for certiorari might successfully distinguish
the cases in conflict on their facts, and may allude to distinctions not
mentioned in the lower court opinions. 21 Respondent also might
successfully argue that the conflict is not yet defined enough to
warrant review and the Court should delay consideration until the
issue has 'percolated' through the lower courts.22 This line of rea-
soning has been very successful in the past.23 As stated by Justice
Brennan, "... there is already in place, and has been ever since Ijoined
the Court, a policy of letting tolerable conflicts go unaddressed until
more than two courts of appeals have considered a question.
'24
Petitioner should bear in mind that a conflict among circuits as to
state law is not a reason for granting certiorari. As the Court stated in
Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance Co., "The conflict may be merely
corollary to a permissible difference of opinion in the state courts."' '
One situation the Court has historically found certworthy is a
conflict between the decision of a federal court of appeals sought to
be reviewed and a decision of the Supreme Court.26 If the decision of
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the court of appeals clearly failed to apply Supreme Court precedent,
the Court will usually grant the petition. It may even reverse the
judgment without hearing oral argument, or, if the Court heard oral
argument, it may reverse without written opinion. 27 It is of paramount
importance that, if petitioner is arguing that the appellate court is in
error and flatly warrants reversal, he should still include an argument
on the merits of the question(s) presented.
28
Certiorari may be granted where the court of appeals clearly has
misapplied or misinterpreted a Supreme Court precedent. 29 In such
cases, the Court grants the petition to clarify its position as well as
reverse the lower court's decision.
30
It must be pointed out that the proportion of state supreme court
cases granted certiorari review is substantially less than federal cases.
State supreme courts often are faced with issues that have no business
in the Supreme Court, while virtually all matters handled by federal
courts may be decided by the Supreme Court. 31 However, one es-
tablished reason for granting certiorari is a direct conflict between the
decision of a court of appeals and the highest state court when such
conflict concerns an important federal question. 32 The Court will
typically review either one of the decisions as it is the final arbiter of
federal questions. 33 According to Stem and Gressman, ".... a conflict
between such courts concerning the construction and application of
the federal Constitution, or the validity, construction, or application
of federal statutes or treaties, or any right, title, privilege, or immunity
thereunder, will support a petition for a writ of certiorari. '34 Forcapital
cases granted certiorari under such conditions, See Sawyer v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990); Mckoy v. North Carolina, I 10 S. Ct. 1227
(1990); Stanford v. KentuckylTWilkins v. Missouri, 109 S.Ct. 2969
(1989); South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989); Mills v.
Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860(1988);Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S.Ct. 1792
(1988);Johnson v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 1981 (1988); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
Petitioner should bear in mind that although there are several
reasons why the Court may deny a petition based upon a conflict, this
avenue may still be the best bet. As Justice Clark once said, "Conflicts
still remain the safest vehicle for a grant.' '35
B. Importance
Regardless of whether a conflict is defined in a petition, the
drafter must prudently marshall and present all of the reasons why the
court should grant the petition. Importance of a case and consequently
its certworthiness hinges foremost upon how many otherparties, aside
from the actual litigants, will be affected by the questions presented.
36
The drafter must persuade the Court that his case does not turn merely
upon its facts or that the question only affects the individual parties.37
As stated by Chief Justice Vinson:
Lawyers might be well advised, in preparing petitions for
certiorari to spend a little less time discussing the merits of
their cases and a little more time demonstrating why it is
important that the Court should hear them.... What the
Court is interested in is the actual, practical effect of the
disputed decision - its consequences for other litigants and
in other situations.... If it succeeds in demonstrating [only]
that the decision below may be erroneous, it has not fulfilled
its purpose.
33
Although a case's importance may simply turn on the workload
of the Court that term, the petition should persuasively assert that the
issues raised are badly in need of the Supreme Court's guidance and
that the question presented has a national impact.3 9 Furthermore, it
should show the decision in question not only is inconsistent with
lower court and Supreme Court decisions, but also common sense and
public policy. Some authors of successful petitions believe that the
single worst mistake petitioners make is to "overestimate the im-
portance of case law and underestimate the importance of policy
considerations." 40
The writ may be granted based on its importance to decide a point
of law expressly reserved or avoided by the court. It may be granted
to clear up inconsistent decisions or when the case at bar contains a
unique issue currently debated in the legal community or one which
the Court has been trying to reach but has been thwarted by threshold
dispositions.4 1 The writ may also be granted when the Court has
granted certiorari to another case which has an issue similar or
identical to one contained in the case at issue. Finally, the Court will
almost always grant the writ when a court of appeals deliberately
refuses to follow Supreme Court precedent in anticipation of personnel
change on the Court.42
When a state statute has been held valid or invalid under the
federal constitution, the Supreme Court will grant certiorari depending
upon the novelty of the issues and the impact of the ruling on other
states.43 This category includes such instances where there is no
conflict per se with a Supreme Court decision but where a state's
application of its statute or procedure is called into question on federal
grounds. For capital granted certiorari under such conditions, See
Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S.Ct.
1257 (1990); Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990); Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (1990); Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092
(1990).
C. Error
The Supreme Court's primary role is to resolve conflicts among
the lower courts so that they can apply the high Court's rulings.
Generally, the Court does not saddle itself with correcting every
mistake the lower courts make in applying its principles.44 However,
the Court occasionally does grant a petition for certiorari for no
apparent reason other than error in the lower court's ruling.45 In such
cases there may be no conflict present, and no issue of importance
facing the Court. But, in granting the petition, the Court may be
motivated by an apparent miscarriage of justice; an unduly harsh
impact of an erroneous decision; the erosion of a legal principle; or the
Court's role as federal judiciary supervisor.46 For examples in capital
cases, see Mckoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990) and
Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990).
Need for Raising a Federal Question
In order for the Supreme Court to have jurisdiction over a
question presented in a petition for certiorari, the question must be
framed in federalized terms, and according to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, a state
court proceeding must have raised a substantial federal question. If a
trial attorney fails to raise and preserve claims on federal grounds, he
effectively waives or defaults such claims. This fact becomes pain-
fully apparent when, during the years that a death penalty case is on
appellate review, a helpful decision is handed down that could benefit
a client, but cannot be applied on any of his federal appeals because
that particular issue was not raised on federal grounds at trial. Of
course it is impossible to anticipate what might be coming down the
pike, but it is imperative to secure every foreseeable federal issue for
appeal.
To preserve an issue for certiorari or other federal review, it is
essential to make a constitutional claim to the state court with at least
fair precision.47 Although the Supreme Court has not provided
specific guidelines, general references to "the Constitution of the
United States" or "due process" usually will not suffice.4 However,
the Court did hold in Eddings v. Oklahoma that the defendant properly
raised an eighth amendment question in a death penalty case although
presented in general terms. 49 The Court stated that "Our jurisdiction
does not depend on citation to book and verse."
50
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The present rule, for our purposes, is that a federal claim cannot
be heard by the Supreme Court unless raised or considered and
resolved by the state supreme court.5 1 The two elements are closely
related in that failure to raise the issue usually precludes the state
supreme court from considering and deciding it.52 Therefore, when
the state supreme court has not addressed a federal issue, this places
the burden on the petitioner to prove that the federal issue was
properly raised, and failure to consider it was not for lack of presen-
tation. The Court stated that when "the highest state court has failed
to pass upon a federal question, it will be assumed that the omission
was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts, unless the
aggrieved party in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary." 53
Supreme Court Rule 14(1)(c) states that a petitioner seeking review of
a state court decision shall "specify the stage in the proceedings, both
in the court of first instance and in the appellate courts, at which the
federal questions sought to be reviewed were raised, the method or
manner of raising them and the way in which they were passed upon
by those courts. ' ' 54 Should the petitioner neglect to preserve or raise
the federal issue with particularity, but nevertheless the state supreme
court addresses the issue in a federal light, the Supreme Court
considers such issue raised and addressed and therefore preserved for
further federal appeals and cert.55
Generally, the petitioner must follow the state procedures in
raising the federal issue. The Supreme Court has held "[a] state
procedural rule which forbids the raising of federal questions at late
stages in the case, or by any other than a prescribed method, has been
recognized as a valid exercise of state power."'56 However, the ulti-
mate question of the sufficiency of a federal question raised in the
state courts is a federal question itself, although the Supreme Court's
authority in this respect is not crystal clear.57 Furthermore, petitioner
may be blocked from federal review of the claim if the state supreme
court decides the issue on "adequate and independent state grounds." 58
Therefore, the federal question must be one of substance and real
conflict. Otherwise, the Court will simply rely upon the state supreme
court to adjudicate the issue.
59
The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse advocates that every
issue that comes up in a capital case can be preserved on federal
grounds. Ever since Gregg v. Georgia and Woodson v. North
Carolina, the Court has focused on the process of choosing which
murderers are to be sentenced to die.60 It has held, and repeatedly
affirmed, that death is qualitatively different from any other punish-
ment. Therefore, in determining that death is the appropriate sentence,
there should be a corresponding difference in the need for reliability. 61
This requirement has been labelled "Super Due Process." Although
the Court has not always held that more is required in every aspect of
a capital proceeding, it has done so often enough to make quite
arguable the proposition that whatever state rule or procedure might
suffice in an ordinary felony case is insufficient in a capital case
because it undermines the increased procedural reliability requirement.
Therefore, all of the sixth amendment rights with respect to juries,
assistance of counsel, right to put on evidence, etc. may be restricted
by the way a state court usually does things. The heightened sixth
amendment entitlement is, of course incorporated into fourteenth
amendment due process, as is the eighth amendment. The eighth
amendment can also be asserted in that it forbids cruel and unusual
punishment. This protection is to be assessed generally and in a given
case, by "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 62 Therefore, state rulings and practices, as well as
these matters in the aggregate, implicate federal law in capital cases.
Accordingly, the trial must clearly reflect that every request, motion,
objection, and claim was made in the name of the sixth, eighth and
fourteenth amendment, as well as appropriate state grounds or other
applicable federal grounds.
Rule of Four
The Supreme Court consistently has followed the practice of
granting certiorari if a minimum of four Justices vote in favor of
granting the petition.63 This practice is called the Rule of Four. When
all nine Justices participate in consideration of the petition, there have
been no exceptions that four votes will suffice to grant the writ.
Subsequently, all nine Justices will consider the case on its merits. If
only six or seven Justices participate, the minimum number of votes
to grant certiorari may be reduced to three. 64 Often, when two or three
Justices have an interest in granting the petition, other Justices will
cast certiorari granting votes as a courtesy.
65
As of today there have been no exceptions to this rule when nine
Justices participate, although the procedure is not codified in the
United States Code or the Supreme Court Rules.
66
Significance of Denial of Petition
A denial of a petition for certiorari is not precedent for, or an
affirmance of, any proposition of law set forth by the lower court.67 A
denial simply demonstrates the Court's discretion to hear the matter
and makes absolutely no comment upon the merits of the case.6S As
previously stated, there are a variety of factors that play into the
decision to grant a petition for certiorari. Anyone outside the Court
would be hard pressed to identify which factors ultimately were
decisive in denying a petition. Therefore, a petitioner should not
interpret a denial as an implication that, were his case to be heard, it
would be decided against him. As Justice Frankfurter stated in Darr
v. Burford:
To attach significance to a denial of a certiorari petition
regarding the merits of the issues raised by the petition
would be to transform a mechanism for keeping cases out of
this Court into a means of bringing them in. It would
contradict all that led to the adoption of certiorari jurisdic-
tion and would reject the whole course of the Court's
treatment of such petitions, both in practice and profession.
For if denial does import an expression of opinion upon the
merits of the case, then we must deal with the merits of the
case.
69
Despite Justice Frankfurter's assurances, there is an undercur-
rent of belief among attorneys that denial of certiorari does have some
significance. 70 However, the overwhelming amount of authority
supports the contention that denial has no precedential value. 71
Stay of Execution
Defense counsel for a capital defendant is faced with the unique
predicament of literally pleading for his client's life while he explores
and exhausts every avenue of review. Fortunately, the Supreme Court
has recognized that stays of execution call for separate consideration
from other stays due to the nature of capital punishment and the ever
accumulating number of applications for stays of execution, many of
which are shortly to expire.
72
In seeking a stay of execution pending Supreme Court review
petitioner must first submit an application to the Supreme Court
Justice of his circuit. That Justice can grant the stay, deny it or not pass
upon it at all. Either way, the application then goes before the full
court to uphold or overrule the Justice or make the initial determination.
Paradoxically, it takes five Justices to uphold a grant of a stay while
it takes only four to grant certiorari.
73
The Court has held that a defendant is entitled to a stay of
execution pending timely filing and disposition of a petition for
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certiorari seeking direct review of his conviction in the state courts. 74
However, the Court is not so accommodating on habeas review.
According to the Court in Barefoot v. Estelle:
Stays of execution are not automatic pending the filing and
consideration of a petition for a writ of certiorari from this
Court to the court of appeals that has denied a writ of habeas
corpus. It is well-established that there 'must be a reasonable
probability that four Members of the Court would consider
the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of
certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must
be a significant possibility of reversal of the lower court's
decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable
harm will result if that decision is not stayed.'... A stay of
execution should first be sought from the court of appeals,
and this Court generally places considerable weight on the
decision reached by the court of appeals in these circum-
stances.
75
The Court refuses to establish a rule that a stay will be auto-
matically granted where the defendant is seeking review of denial of
his first habeas corpus petition. However, a stay is likely granted on
the first or second application if petitioner raises new and different
questions that merit determination in the case at issue or another
pending case.76 Barefoot also held that a defendant is entitled to a stay
of execution when a federal court of appeals considers his habeas
petition on its merits if it determines that the contentions are not
frivolous. 77 However, the Court has also asserted that the petition for
habeas corpus should not be abused. That is, petitioner should not
repeatedly file the same petition and appeal as a delaying tactic.
78
Accordingly, successive petitions and stays of execution may be
dismissed if the petition fails to raise a new and different question.
Procedural Issues
Briefly, the petition for certiorari must be filed with the clerk's
office no later than ninety days from the date of: (1) the lower court's
entry ofjudgment; (2) the date of the lower court's denial of a petition
for rehearing;79 or (3) a revised judgment that modifies an issue
intended for cert. A proper filing includes 40 copies of the petition and
a two hundred dollar filing fee.80
In the face of an impending deadline, an attorney can request a 30
day extension for "good cause shown," provided he submits his
request 10 days before the filing deadline. Good cause includes: death
or illness of counsel, printing difficulties or imminence of a decision
of another case in another proceeding that may affect an issue in the
case or render an issue moot. Should a petitioner request an extension
subsequent to 10 days prior to the deadline, only extraordinary
circumstances will suffice, such as attorney death.
It is important to note that the Court feels compelled to give
capital cases a very thorough examination when deciding whether to
grant cert, and, therefore, insists on having the entire certified record
before it as part of that examination. The petitioner need not supply
a copy of the record but should be aware that the clerk will take the
necessary steps to secure it if petitioner does not.
81
Although truly pro se petitions for cert are a distinct minority,
almost 50% of all petitions are filed in forma pauperis. 82 They are
usually prepared by counsel assigned through various federal legal
assistance programs, or by an individual other than the party seeking
review. 83 In forma pauperis status allows the petitioner to waive fees
and printing requirements and provides appointed counsel after the
Court grants certiorari.
Supreme Court Rule 39 requires that only three documents be
submitted to the Court to establish in forma pauperis status. Briefly,
- petitioner must file a short motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and include the party's sworn affidavit of
indigency or poverty (affidavit not necessary where a lower
federal court has appointed counsel for defendant) as well as
the petition for writ of certiorari
- each of the foregoing documents must be prepared in
typewritten form, double-spaced on legal sized paper; only
one copy need be filed with the clerk although nine additional
copies would be preferred
- upon timely presentation, the clerk will file the documents
without any payment of fees
• should the writ be granted, the Court will appoint counsel
to prepare briefs and oral argument.
For the most part, the in forma pauperis petitioner must adhere to
all the requirements placed on his paying counterpart. Either way, the
Court must still give equal treatment and consideration to both
petitions. Unfortunately, the Court rarely grants more than 1% of the
petitions filed in forma pauperis, while the success rate of paid cases
hovers around 8% and 12%, including cases summarily disposed of at
the time the writ is granted.
84
Conclusion
The chances of having any one petition for certiorari granted are
indeed slim. However, the odds can be improved exponentially by
paying close attention to past practices of the Court and Supreme
Court cases similar in issue to one's own. As always, petitioner should
remember that regardless of the effort expended, the return on 'in-
vestment' is immeasureable.
IThe reader will notice numerous references to Supreme Court
Practice (Sixth Ed.), authored by Stem, Gressman and Shapiro. This
treatise is the essential authority on certiorari and no petitioner should
be without it. For stylistic suggestions for the petition of certiorari,
please see Baker, "A Practical Guide to Certiorari," 33 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 611 (1984) [Hereinafter Baker].
2See Capital Defense Digest Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 1-15.
3See accompanying text at 17-19.
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52Ster and Gressman, supra note 5, at 150.
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711d.
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73Consequently, the Court may decide to hear a case, but is
foreclosed when the prisoner is executed. Such a case of ultimate
mootness occurred only last year when James Edward Smith was
executed in the state of Texas. Hours before the scheduled execution,
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens voted to grant
certiorari. However, no fifth Justice stepped forward to grant the stay
and the execution proceeded. In past years, a fifth Justice would step
forward as a courtesy to the cert-granting justices. That Justice was
usually Lewis Powell. In Smith's case, however, no fifth vote was
forthcoming and the prisoner suffered the consequences. Only time
will tell whether such occurrences will become more frequent. Legal
Times, November 19, 1990, at 10.
In Virginia, the circuit court often does not set an execution
date after the Virginia Supreme Court has completed its review and
affirmed the conviction. The Commonwealth usually waits until
the Fourth Circuit has denied federal habeas review before setting
an execution date.
74Williams v. Misouri, 463 U.S. 1301 (1983).
75Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895-96 (1983) (quoting
White v. Florida, 458 U.S. 1301 (1982)).
76Stern and Gressman, supra note 5, at 701.
771d. at 702.
78Barefoot, 403 U.S. at 895.
79In light of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and its
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final so that advantage may be taken of new caselaw announced
during the period. Please see Capital Defense Digest Vol. 3, No. 1,
pages 1-5.
80Sup. Ct. R. 29, 14, and 38.
81Stern and Gressman, supra note 5, at 445.
821d. at 425.
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How to Look the Virginia Gift Horse in The Mouth: Federal Due
Process and Virginia's Arbitrary Abrogation of Capital
Defendant's State-Created Rights
BY: OTTO W. KONRAD
Once a capital defendant has been convicted and sentenced to
death, the Virginia Supreme Court is the last word on any questions
of state law arising out of the trial.' Therefore, because the Virginia
Supreme Court historically has afforded capital defendants very little
relief,2 a trial record devoid of federal issues puts very few judicial
obstacles between the defendant and the electric chair.3 Previous
articles in the Capital Defense Digest have discussed a variety of
federal issues that arise in virtually every capital trial. 4 Further,
previous Digest articles have discussed the importance of properly
preserving federal issues for state and federal appellate review. 5 This
article takes the concern with federal issues in a new direction by
addressing the following question - How can capital defense attor-
neys find federal issues in what appears to be purely state law? The
short answer to this question is "fourteenth amendment due process."
Fourteenth amendment due process encompasses two distinct
groups of interests.6 The first is derived from federal law and includes
those rights protected in the provisions of the Bill of Rights that have
been "incorporated" into the fourteenth amendment.7 The second group
of interests include property and liberty rights that state law has
created.8 Of these two groups of fourteenth amendment interests,
state-created liberty rights are the key to developing new federal
issues out of state capital murder law. This article first will attempt
to define these state-created liberty rights. Second, this article will
distill a methodology from the case law that both identifies these
rights and permits one to ascertain what procedural due process these
rights require. Third, this article will discuss the abrogation of a
number of state-created rights pertaining to Virginia appellate review
of death sentences. Finally, this article will touch on how capital
